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ABSTRACT 
Given the increasing financial impact of cybercrime, it has become critical for companies to 
manage information security risk. The practitioner literature has long argued that the 
internal audit function (IAF) can play an important role both in providing assurance with 
respect to information security and in generating insights about how to improve the 
organization’s information security. Nevertheless, there is scant empirical evidence to 
support this belief.  Using a unique data set, this study examines how the quality of the 
relationship between the internal audit and the information security functions affects 
objective measures of the overall effectiveness of an organization’s information security 
efforts. The quality of this relationship has a positive effect on the number of reported 
internal control weaknesses and incidents of noncompliance, as well as on the numbers of 
security incidents detected, both before and after they caused material harm to the 
organization. In addition, we find that higher levels of management support for information 
security and having the chief information security officer (CISO) report independently of 
the IT function have a positive effect on the quality of the relationship between the internal 
audit and information security functions.  
Keywords: Information Security, Internal Audit, IT audit, Governance, Risk Management
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The influence of a good relationship between the internal audit and 
information security functions on information security outcomes  
1. Introduction 
Cybercrime can have a significant, direct economic impact on organizations through 
asset misappropriation, theft of sensitive private information, disruption of online 
operations, and legal costs to settle consumer claims about harm (Hong, 2016; ISACA, 
2016; Minaya, 2015; PWC, 2016a; 2016b).  It can also have an indirect economic effect, 
given that the disclosure of information security risk factors, governance policies, and 
information security breaches can significantly impact firm value (Gordon, Loeb, & Sohail, 
2010; Higgs, Pinsker, Smith, & Young, 2016; Wang, Kannan, & Ulmer, 2013). In addition, 
cybercrime poses “a different focal point of concern [and] a different ‘subject’ of risk”, 
(Power, 2013, p. 538), because perpetrators are often unknown agents outside the 
organization. This is in contrast to asset theft and financial disclosure risks, where the focus 
is typically on the actions of identifiable individuals within the organization. Hence, it is not 
surprising that information security ranks as one of the top concerns for both accounting 
professionals (Drew, 2015; Hill, 2015) and senior management (Luftman & Ben-Zvi, 2010).   
Who should be responsible for managing information security risks? The obvious 
answer would seem to be a dedicated group within the IT function. An ISACA (2011) 
report, however, suggests that information security risk management is the responsibility 
of not just a dedicated group within the information technology (IT) function, but also 
should involve other functions within organizations, including the internal audit function 
(IAF). 
The problem of information security risk management therefore provides an 
important context for research on internal audit as a governance and risk management 
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mechanism. Sarens (2009) argues “…the IAF can have a positive impact on the quality of 
risk management and internal control processes” (p. 4). Indeed, top management expects 
the IAF to compensate for the loss of control that comes through increased organizational 
complexity by both “providing independent assurance” and by “actively contributing to 
improving of processes and internal controls” (Sarens & De Beedle, 2006, p. 238).  
Similarly, the practice literature indicates that two of the most important responsibilities of 
the IAF are to provide assurance about process effectiveness and insights about how to 
improve performance (Seago, 2017). Despite this consensus among academics, managers, 
and internal audit professionals that an effective IAF should improve governance and risk 
management, there is little research that addresses whether the IAF actually does improve 
governance and risk management outcomes (Carcello, Hermanson, & Ye, 2011; Eden & 
Moriah, 1996; Gramling, Maletta, Schneider, & Church, 2004). Instead, prior research has 
tended to focus on respondents’ perceptions of the efficacy of the IAF in improving risk 
management processes, without reporting objective data on the outcomes from these 
processes (e.g., Arena, Arnaboldi, & Azzone, 2010; Carcello, Eulerich, Masli, & Wood, 2017; 
de Zwaan, Stewart, & Subramaniam, 2011; Ma'ayan & Carmeli, 2016; Paape & Speklè, 
2013).  
This study addresses the aforementioned gap in the literature. We use a unique data 
set obtained through the cooperation of the Information Management and Technology 
Assurance section of the AICPA that provides objective measures of leading and lagging 
information security outcomes. The leading measures are the number of internal control 
weaknesses related to information security and the number of IT-related noncompliance 
issues that were material enough to be brought to the attention to executive management 
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or the Board of Directors. It is important to detect and subsequently correct internal 
control weaknesses because they represent vulnerabilities that criminals can exploit. 
Similarly, employee noncompliance with security policies (e.g., sharing passwords, clicking 
on links in fraudulent emails, and failing to update security-related software) often 
contributes to security breaches. The lagging measures are the number of incidents 
stopped before causing material harm, and the number of security incidents that were 
detected only after they caused material harm. The number of incidents detected and 
stopped before causing material harm is a primary objective of an effective information 
security program. The number of security incidents discovered after causing harm is 
important because organizations cannot “stop the bleeding” and take steps to recover from 
an incident until they discover that they have been attacked. Indeed, organizations often do 
not become aware of significant information security breaches until long after the attack 
occurred (Ernst & Young, 2015; Lewis, 2013; Verizon, 2015). Therefore, timely detection of 
security breaches after they cause harm can still potentially mitigate the organization’s 
losses. 
We examine how the quality of the working relationship between the internal audit 
and information security functions influences these four measures of information security 
outcomes. We focus on the quality of the working relationship between the internal audit 
and information security functions because relationships between the IAF and other 
business functions are important determinants of audit quality and the IAF’s ability to add 
value to organizations (Havelka & Merhout, 2013; Merhout & Havelka, 2008; Stoel, 
Havelka, & Merhout, 2012).  
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Our results show that a higher-quality relationship between the internal audit and 
information security functions results in a greater number of reported internal control 
weaknesses and noncompliance incidents. We also find that the quality of the relationship 
between internal audit and information security has a positive effect on the number of 
security incidents detected, both before and after causing material harm to the 
organization. Furthermore, we find that the level of top management support for security 
improves the quality of the relationship between internal audit and information security. It 
also reduces the number of both security-related internal control weaknesses and 
compliance issues, but does not affect the number of incidents detected, either before or 
after causing harm to the organization. Finally, while independence of the information 
security function from the CIO improves the quality of the relationship between internal 
audit and information security, it does not affect any of the four security-related outcomes. 
This study makes three primary contributions. First, it investigates the effectiveness 
of internal audit as a governance and risk management mechanism and informs practice 
regarding the influence of relationships between internal auditors and managers on 
internal audit’s effectiveness. In particular, we provide empirical evidence to support 
Havelka and Merhout’s (2013) propositions concerning the importance of a good working 
relationship between the IAF and other functions. Second, the study makes a contribution 
to the risk management literature by examining the influence of governance mechanisms 
on specific actual outcomes, rather than perceptions of such effects. Third, we show how 
the level of top management support for security and the independence of the information 
security function from the CIO affect the quality of the relationship between internal audit 
and information security and influences information security outcomes.  
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2. Background  
The IAF should play an active role in information security governance and 
enterprise risk management efforts with respect to information security (Arena et al., 
2010; Busco, Giovannoni, Riccaboni, Frigo, & Scapens, 2006; Havelka & Merhout, 2013; 
Héroux & Fortin, 2013; Merhout & Havelka, 2008; Stoel et al., 2012).  According to COBIT5 
(ISACA, 2012a), the regular monitoring of performance (Process MEA01) and independent 
auditing of security (Process MEA02) are an important part of these governance efforts. 
The IAF, however, is only one potential assurance provider in this area (Institute of Internal 
Auditors, 2013a).  Regular monitoring and reviewing activities (e.g., analyzing computer 
logs) performed by the information systems function itself also improve the effectiveness 
of information security controls (Ransbotham & Mitra, 2009). Certainly, self-monitoring is 
useful, and indeed, “line management...provides assurance as a first line of defense over the 
risks and controls for which they are responsible” (Institute of Internal Auditors, 2013a, 
para 4). Yet, there is considerable evidence that people have great difficulty in identifying 
and in correcting errors in systems that they created themselves (Panko, 1999; Panko & 
Sprague Jr., 1998; Powell, Baker, & Lawson, 2008; Ricketts, 1990; Teo & Tan, 1999). The 
presumed value of internal audit review is that the IAF maintains a greater degree of 
independence from information security activities than personnel within the IT function 
(Institute of Internal Auditors, 2013a). This independence enables the IAF to provide 
honest feedback about the effectiveness of existing controls (Merhout & Havelka, 2008; 
Stoel et al., 2012).  
Both the information security and internal audit professions believe that the two 
functions play an important role in regards to managing information security risks (Center 
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for Internet Security, 2015; Flora & Raj, 2015). Information security executives believe that 
both formal involvement of the internal audit function and informal coordination between 
the internal audit and information security functions are essential for the deployment of an 
effective information security strategy (Kayworth & Whitten, 2010). In addition, IT and 
security managers perceive that effective dialogue with auditors aids in the discovery of 
security vulnerabilities and in the design of recommendations for security improvements 
(Werlinger, Hawkey, Botta, & Beznosov, 2009).  Furthermore, IT audit professionals believe 
that audits can potentially provide useful insights and recommendations for improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of an organization’s information security efforts (Khan, 2016; 
Merhout & Havelka, 2008; Stoel et al., 2012). They also believe that the relationship 
between IT auditors and IT professionals is important to the success of the IAF in providing 
these insights (Havelka & Merhout 2013; Merhout & Havelka, 2008; Stoel et al., 2012).  
However, in many organizations, the relationships among the various functional 
groups involved in information security are less than ideal. Internal auditors often 
experience conflict and even adversarial relationships with other organizational functions 
(Ahmad & Taylor, 2009; Dittenhofer, Ramamoorti, Ziegenfuss, & Evans, 2010; Roussy, 
2015; Van Peursem, 2005). Similarly, security professionals report experiencing conflict 
with the rest of the IT function and the CIO (ThreatTrack, 2016). Thus, it is not surprising 
that the relationship between the internal audit and information security functions is 
sometimes characterized by conflict and distrust (Steinbart, Raschke, Gal, & Dilla, 2012). 
Indeed, all too often, instead of coordinating their information security efforts, the 
various functions operate independently of one another. It is up to senior management to 
mitigate these problems:  
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The problem is politics; the solution is a culture of security … The most useful 
contribution senior management can make to a security culture, aside from 
intentionally championing its existence, is to ensure that all those with converging 
security responsibilities reinforce one another rather than needlessly, heedlessly 
fighting for their own “turf” at the expense of one another and the detriment of the 
security cultures in their enterprises (ISACA, 2011, p. 104). 
 
Turf battles that impede multiple functions from sharing responsibility for information 
security perhaps represent only the most extreme of possible dysfunctional outcomes. 
Another possibility is that the various responsible parties will develop “silo” mentalities, 
and thus fail to cooperate and to coordinate their efforts (Arena et al., 2010). In either case, 
an effective IT governance structure is important to overcome those potential impediments 
to effective information security risk management (Love, Reinhard, Schwab, & Spafford, 
2010). This governance structure consists of the Board of Directors, who provides 
oversight over information security, executive management, who provides leadership in 
the management of information security risks, managers, who have responsibility for 
implementing and monitoring information security controls, and internal auditors, who 
provide independent evaluations of information security risk management.  
Consequently, the central focus of our research model, shown in Figure 1, is the 
impact of the quality of the relationship between the IAF and the information security 
function on the effectiveness of an organization’s information security efforts. The model 
includes two additional factors related to the efficacy of an organization’s information 
security governance: (1) top management’s support for and interest in information security 
issues, and (2) whether the CISO reports to someone independent of the information 
security function. These factors are predicted to not only affect information security 
outcomes, but also to affect the relationship between the internal audit and information 
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security functions. The next section discusses each component of the research model in 
more detail. 
Place Figure 1 here 
3. Hypotheses 
3.1 Influence of relationship between internal audit and information security functions on 
security outcomes 
Havelka and Merhout (2013) develop a comprehensive model of the factors that influence 
audit quality, based on an extensive literature review and detailed interviews with internal 
IT auditors. One key component of their model is how the nature of the relationship 
between the IAF and other business units (part of what they refer to as the enterprise 
environment), and with the auditee in particular (which they refer to as the client’s audit 
posture), affect audit quality, specifically the IAF’s ability to provide advice that might 
improve operations. Havelka and Merhout (2013) argue that good working relationships 
between the IAF and other parts of the organization improve both audit efficiency and 
effectiveness because they improve the auditor’s access to evidence and also increase the 
business unit’s honesty and openness in communications with the IAF. Their arguments 
are consistent with earlier statements in the professional literature that a good working 
relationship with the auditee improves the auditor’s access to evidence, especially “soft” 
evidence with respect to attitudes and behaviors (Dittenhofer, 1997). 
Empirical research is consistent with those assertions. For example, one of Steinbart 
et al.’s (2012) respondents states that “…[in] a lot of places that I’ve seen and been, it’s been 
a game of cat and mouse. The auditors are trying to catch IT doing something, IT is trying to 
prevent audit from finding out (p. 235).” The respondent also states that when internal 
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audit and the information security function cooperate, they work together to identify risk, 
to reduce risk, and to fix problems that are identified. Consistent with this observation, 
Fanning and Piercey (2014) find that the internal auditor’s interpersonal likability 
increases managers’ receptivity to well-structured internal audit recommendations. In 
contrast, Roussy (2015) finds that internal auditors who experience role conflict with 
auditees engage in coping behaviors that compromise the auditors’ independence. This in 
turn negatively impacts the ability of the auditor to successfully execute the audit 
engagement and to identify, develop, and communicate audit findings. 
 Thus, a good working relationship between the internal audit and the information 
security functions should facilitate the IAF’s ability to identify security issues and suggest 
ways to address them. We refer to this as the collaborative detection effect. However, it is 
not the only positive outcome associated with a good working relationship between the 
two functions.  
 A second potential benefit from a good working relationship between the internal 
audit and information security functions is that it can lead to knowledge transfer, wherein 
the information security function uses advice from the IAF to improve the design and 
functioning of security controls. Havelka and Merhout (2013, p. 178) allude to this when 
they note, “it would be reasonable to assume that based on the results of an IT audit a 
system or process would be improved or changed.” For example, Steinbart et al. (2012) 
report a situation where an internal auditor’s ability to view security issues from a 
business process perspective influenced the information security manager’s understanding 
of how to achieve effective segregation of duties. Dialogue between the security manager 
and the internal auditor helped improve the security manager’s understanding of this issue 
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and resulted in improved controls over access rights and permissions. Indeed, there is 
empirical evidence that cooperation between the IAF and the management of the audited 
process improves the quality of risk management processes (Arena et al., 2010), increases 
the likelihood that managers will accept and act upon audit recommendations (Arena & 
Azzone, 2009), and indirectly improves unit efficiency by facilitating auditees’ learning 
from audits (Ma’ayan & Carmeli, 2016).  
Knowledge transfer is more likely to occur when different units within the same 
organization perceive themselves as having a common set of values or sharing the same 
focus or purpose (Morris & Empson, 1998). In such cases, the recipient unit is willing to 
expend more time and effort in evaluating the merits of knowledge possessed by the other 
unit. For example, Bauer and Estep (2016) found that audit effectiveness improved when 
there was a good relationship between the financial and IT auditors in Big Four firms, 
because the sharing of knowledge resulted in more timely detection and resolution of audit 
issues. 
However, groups do not automatically perceive a common purpose just because 
they have a formal relationship with one another. Arena et al. (2010) report variability 
across organizations in the degree to which internal audit and risk management functions 
cooperate with each other, and Steinbart et al. (2012) report variability across 
organizations in the degree to which internal audit and information security have a 
cooperative working relationship with one another. Similarly, Bauer and Estep (2016) also 
found variability across firms in the quality of the relationship between the financial and IT 
auditors. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the quality of relationships between the 
internal audit and the information security functions will vary from organization to 
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organization and that those differences will be reflected in various measures of security 
outcomes.  
The preceding discussion suggests that a good working relationship between the 
internal audit and information security functions can improve information security 
outcomes because greater cooperation and openness between the two functions enables 
the IAF to generate more and better recommendations (the collaborative detection effect). 
In addition, a good working relationship enables the information security function to have 
a better understanding of the reasoning behind the IAF’s recommendations, therefore 
increasing the likelihood that the information security function will act on these 
recommendations (the knowledge transfer effect). However, the timing of the collaborative 
detection and knowledge transfer effects on leading and lagging measures of information 
security effectiveness is likely to differ.  
The effects of collaborative detection can arise almost immediately, because the 
information security function will allow the IAF to have access to more and better 
information about existing processes and controls. Thus, the collaborative detection 
aspects of a better working relationship between the internal audit and information 
security functions may increase the number of security-related internal control 
weaknesses and noncompliance incidents that are detected and reported. This prediction is 
consistent with the finding by Lin, Pizzini, Vargus, & Bardhan (2011) that publicly traded 
firms are more likely to report material internal control weaknesses when the IAF 
coordinates audit activities with the external auditors. 
On the other hand, the knowledge transfer effect suggests that the detection of 
leading indicators will decline over time, as organizations take steps to resolve previously 
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identified issues. However, the benefits of any improvements in the design and the 
operation of security controls due to knowledge transfer may likely require additional time 
before being reflected in fewer security-related internal control weaknesses. Similarly, it 
will likely take time, and the enforcement of sanctions by management, before increased 
success in detecting employee noncompliance with security policies results in greater 
adherence to those policies. 
Thus, at any given point in time it is not clear whether the collaborative detection or 
knowledge transfer effects will prevail. Therefore, we state the following non-directional 
hypothesis concerning the effects of relationship quality on leading measures of 
information security effectiveness:  
H1a: The quality of the relationship between the internal audit and information 
security functions will influence leading indicators of an organization’s 
information security effectiveness (i.e., number of security-related internal 
control weaknesses reported to the Board of Directors and number of incidents 
of employee noncompliance with IT policies).  
In contrast to the preceding discussion, both the collaborative detection and 
knowledge transfer effects clearly predict that a better working relationship between the 
internal audit and information security functions will increase the number of attacks 
detected and stopped prior to causing material harm. The collaborative detection effect 
suggests that this will happen because a better working relationship increases the 
detection and reporting of security-related internal control weaknesses and 
noncompliance incidents, thereby enabling those vulnerabilities to be addressed.  Fewer 
vulnerabilities means less opportunity for attacks to succeed. Similarly, the knowledge 
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transfer effect suggests that a positive relationship between the internal audit and 
information security functions will result in improved design and operation of controls. 
Better controls means that more attacks are detected and stopped before they can cause 
material harm. Therefore, we posit the following directional hypothesis: 
H1b: The quality of the relationship between the internal audit and information 
security functions will increase the number of attacks that are detected and stopped 
before causing material harm to the organization. 
At first consideration, the collaborative detection and knowledge transfer effects 
appear to suggest that a quality relationship between the internal audit and information 
security functions should also reduce the number of attacks that are not detected until after 
causing material harm. As discussed above, improved detective capabilities should enable 
organizations to detect and stop attacks before they can succeed in causing material harm. 
In addition, over time, the improved design and operation of controls achieved through 
knowledge transfer should result in fewer vulnerabilities that can be exploited to conduct 
successful attacks.  
However, the logic of the preceding arguments is contingent upon a stable base rate 
of attacks using known methods. That assumption is problematic; indeed, it is likely that 
the base rate of attacks is increasing, due in part to the increased number of opportunities 
associated with the continuous growth in connectivity, particularly that involving the 
Internet of Things (IoT), and also because continuous changes to IT infrastructure 
constantly create new potential avenues for attack (ISACA 2016). Furthermore, new “zero-
day” attacks (Tanaka & Goto 2014) that take advantage of previously unknown software 
vulnerabilities to successfully bypass current defensive measures are constantly surfacing.  
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Thus, a better working relationship between the internal audit and information security 
functions may not necessarily prevent attacks that use these new methods and 
vulnerabilities from succeeding. However, it should enable more timely detection, albeit 
only after the attack causes harm. Indeed, such belated discovery may still be beneficial if it 
helps organizations to “stop the bleeding” more quickly. 
These competing possibilities suggest that a quality relationship between the 
internal audit and information security functions could either decrease or increase the 
number of information security incidents that are detected after causing harm. Therefore, 
we state the following non-directional hypothesis: 
H1c: The quality of the relationship between the internal audit and information 
security functions will influence the number of attacks that are detected only 
after causing material harm.  
3.2 Importance of top management support   
Internal control frameworks (e.g., COSO, COSO-ERM, and COBIT5) stress the 
importance of the role senior management plays in effective governance. For example, IT 
internal control guidance recommends that senior management must “foster an 
information security-positive culture and environment” (ISACA 2012b, Process EDM01.02, 
activity 6). To accomplish that objective, senior management should “promote the 
information security function within the enterprise” (ISACA 2012b, Process APO02.06, 
activity 3), “proactively” support and communicate the importance of information security 
(ISACA 2012b, Enabling Behavior 6), and create a culture of information security (Ross, 
2011). Consistent with this normative guidance, the internal audit and the information 
security professions have long argued that top management support and involvement is 
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important with respect to information security (Center for Internet Security, 2015; Flora & 
Raj, 2015; IT Governance Institute, 2008; Kayworth & Whitten, 2010; Khan, 2016). 
Given the lack of directly observable measures of top management support, there is 
no direct evidence of an association between top management support and information 
security outcomes. One indirect indicator for top management support, however, is the 
level at which IT governance issues are addressed in the organization. Kwon, Ulmer, and 
Wang (2013) find that firms that include an IT executive as part of the top management 
team are less likely to report information security breaches. They also find a negative 
association between IT executives’ compensation and the likelihood of an information 
security breach. Higgs et al. (2016) find that disclosures of security breaches are inversely 
related to the length of time that a company’s Board of Directors has had a technology 
committee. Thus, both of these studies provide support for an association between top 
management involvement and improved information security outcomes. 
A second indicator of top management support is the presence and nature of 
information security-related disclosures in a firm’s annual report. Li (2015) finds a positive 
association between Chinese firms’ disclosure of security-related content in their annual 
reports and the quality of their online security procedures. Wang, et al. (2013) find that 
firms who report that they are proactively taking steps to manage cyber risks are less likely 
to have disclosed security breaches than firms who do not report they are actively 
mitigating cyber risks. 
Thus, there is evidence that the active involvement of senior management in 
addressing security issues improves an organization’s overall security. Such improvement 
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should be reflected in both leading and lagging measures of security effectiveness. This 
leads to our second set of hypotheses: 
H2a: A higher level of top management support for information security will 
improve leading indicators of an organization’s information security 
effectiveness (i.e., reduce the number of security-related internal control 
weaknesses reported to the Board of Directors and number of incidents of 
employee noncompliance with IT policies). 
H2b: A higher level of top management support for information security will 
improve lagging measures of the effectiveness of an organization’s information 
security efforts (i.e., increase the number of attacks that are detected and 
stopped before causing material harm to the organization and decrease the 
number of attacks that are detected only after causing material harm). 
The level of top management support for information security might also have a 
positive influence on the relationship between the internal audit and information security 
functions. The first way that this might occur is through top management directly 
encouraging a collaborative relationship between internal audit and information security. 
For example, Sarens and De Beelde (2006) find that in organizations where top 
management places a priority on managing risk and improving internal controls, 
management works to foster the acceptance and appreciation of the IAF. Similarly, Arena, 
et al. (2010) report that in an organization where top management strongly supported 
enterprise risk management (ERM) activities, the internal audit department and Chief Risk 
Officer worked together on ERM. On the other hand, in another organization where top 
management viewed ERM as a compliance exercise, the internal audit department 
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struggled to cooperate with managers who were directly responsible for ERM.  Consistent 
with these findings, an internal auditor from one of Steinbart et al.’s (2012) respondent 
organizations stated, “Our chief auditor and our senior vice president of IT are very much 
in that partnering mode, they really feel that [between] audit and IT, there should be a 
partnership, and it should not be adversarial (p. 237).” Similarly, the information systems 
security manager at the same organization explained:  
The senior executives identify that, they embrace it. They get along well. I don’t see any 
conflict or territory battles or any of that here...That’s the most important thing from 
the workforce point of view. When they see that demonstrated up high, that’s how they 
follow suit. They watch this, and then they know that’s the expectation and it’s pretty 
effortless here. People partner and just get along well with the same goal in mind. It 
shows (Steinbart et al. 2012, p. 237).  
Top management support for information security can also have an indirect 
influence on the relationship between the internal audit and information security functions 
by encouraging and enabling increased audit attention to information security issues. Even 
though the chief audit executive (CAE) is independent of management, internal auditing 
standards indicate that the CAE must consider senior management input on risks faced by 
the organization when planning internal audit activities (Institute of Internal Auditors, 
2013b).  Indeed, the information security managers interviewed by Steinbart et al. (2012) 
perceived that the level of internal audit resources devoted to information security 
depends on top management’s interest in this area. Top management’s provision of those 
resources is important, given that information security personnel perceive that the IAF’s 
level of information security knowledge and the frequency with which the IAF reviews 
information security have a positive impact on the quality of the relationship between the 
two functions (Steinbart, Raschke, Gal, & Dilla, 2013).  
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Consistent with these findings, Ma’ayan and Carmeli (2016) also report a positive 
relationship between top management’s support of the internal audit function and the 
quality of auditor / auditee relationships. Finally, greater top management support for 
information security and its importance as an overarching organizational objective is likely 
to increase the perceptions of the internal audit and information security functions that 
they share a common goal, which, in turn, should improve relationships between these 
organizational units (Kane, 2010). The preceding discussion leads to our third hypothesis: 
H3: A higher level of top management support for information security improves 
the relationship between the internal audit and information security functions. 
3.3 Importance of reporting structure for information security 
The professional literature stresses that it is important to assign responsibility for 
information security to an individual at an appropriate level of management (ISACA 2012b, 
Process EDM01.02, activity 2). A common title for such a position is Chief Information 
Security Officer (CISO). Organizations which have a CISO have more confidence in dealing 
with malware incidents in a timely manner, are more willing to extend assurances to 
customers about the safety of their data, and are twice as likely to have incident response 
teams, compared to organizations which do not have a CISO (ThreatTrack, 2016).  
In addition to the existence of a CISO position in an organization, the reporting level 
and authority of the CISO is also important (PWC, 2016b). Ideally, the CISO should not 
report to the CIO because: 
… [there is an] inherent conflict of interest. Information security, due to its efforts to 
ensure security, is often perceived as a constraint on IT operations. CIOs and their IT 
departments are usually under pressure to increase performance and cut costs. 
Information security is often the victim of these pressures. Finally, it must be 
 19 
considered that for information security to be effective, it must be more closely 
aligned with business than with technology. (IT Governance Institute, 2008, p. 19). 
  
The argument for having the CISO report to an independent party outside IT is similar to 
the arguments that the IAF should not report to management, because of the potential for 
conflict of interest (ISACA, 2012b). Information security is not just a technical issue to be 
delegated to the IT function, rather, cyber threats must be included as part of an 
organization’s comprehensive risk management process. This objective is more likely to be 
accomplished if the CISO reports to the CEO, or to a chief risk officer, an individual who has 
overall responsibility for managing risk at the executive level (ISACA 2012b; PwC 2016b). 
An independent CISO should be able to deploy resources to more effectively manage both 
leading and lagging indicators of information security effectiveness. For example, Arena et 
al. (2010, p. 666) describe an organization where the: 
relevance of the SD (Security Department) is further legitimated by its direct 
relationships with the CEO and the Executive Committee. . . and the SD head 
negotiates directly with the Executive Committee on the budget for security costs 
and investments.  
This leads to the following hypotheses: 
H4a: Organizations in which the CISO reports to someone outside the IT function 
will have more effective leading measures of information security effectiveness 
(i.e., fewer security-related internal control weaknesses reported to the Board of 
Directors and fewer incidents of employee noncompliance with IT policies) than 
organizations in which the CISO reports to an individual inside the IT function. 
H4b: Organizations in which the CISO reports to someone outside the IT function 
will have more effective lagging measures of information security effectiveness 
(i.e., a greater number of attacks that are detected and stopped before causing 
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material harm to the organization and fewer attacks that are detected only after 
causing material harm) than organizations in which the CISO reports to an 
individual inside the IT function. 
In addition, the reporting structure for the CISO may impact the way in which the 
IAF and information security groups interact.  San Miguel and Govindarajan (1984) found 
that in organizations where controllers had independent reporting relationships (i.e., to 
someone other than the divisional general manager), internal auditors tended to focus 
more on efficiency and effectiveness auditing and less on compliance auditing, compared to 
organizations where the controllers were not independent. This suggests that in the 
context of information security, internal auditors might focus more on process 
improvements and less on compliance in organizations where the CISO has an independent 
relationship with senior management, rather than reporting to the CIO. Steinbart et al. 
(2012; 2015) find that when information security audits focus less on compliance and 
more on process improvements, a better working relationship between internal audit and 
information security exists. Therefore, having the CISO report independently of the IT 
function may also improve the quality of the relationship between the internal audit and 
information security functions. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H5: The relationship between the internal audit and information security functions 
will be better in organizations in which the head of information security reports 
to someone outside IT compared to organizations where information security 
reports to the CIO. 
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3.4 Control variables 
 Figure 1 includes three other factors that are likely to influence the overall 
effectiveness of an organization’s information security efforts. The first is the level of effort 
that the organization invests in information security. Increasing the effort devoted to 
information security should improve security outcomes (Ransbotham & Mitra 2009).  We 
use percentage of IT staff time devoted to information security as our measurement of 
effort. The second is the size of the organization. A recent ISACA (2016) survey of the state 
of cybersecurity reports that the three most common methods used in successful attacks 
are phishing, malware, and social engineering. The risk of such threats is directly related to 
the number of employees. Therefore, we use number of employees to measure size. The 
final control variable included in our model is whether or not the IAF is outsourced. 
Prawitt, Smith and Wood (2009) argue that outsourcing the IAF may improve the quality of 
IT-related controls, especially in smaller firms, where it may be difficult to hire and retain 
specialized IT audit staff. On the other hand, Steinbart et al. (2012) report that outsourcing 
the IAF reduces informal communication between internal auditors and the information 
security function, which in turn may have a negative impact on information security 
outcomes. Therefore, we include whether IAF is outsourced as a control variable, but do 
not predict the direction of its effect on security outcomes. 
4. Research method 
4.1 Procedure 
 We conducted a web-based survey of IT auditors that were members of the IMTA 
section of the AICPA. The survey (see Appendix A) was part of a larger study that contained 
additional questions not related to the research questions explored in this study. The IMTA 
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section’s executive committee sent an email message to its members encouraging their 
participation in the study. Potential participants were informed that there would be a raffle 
to award an iPad mini to one randomly selected participant who completed the entire 
survey. A follow-up invitation was sent out two weeks after the initial email. 
4.2 Independent and control variables 
 Relationship quality and top management support were both treated as reflective 
latent constructs. We used four questions that had been previously validated by Steinbart 
et al. (2013) to measure the quality of the relationship between the IAF and information 
security functions. We also used five questions that had been previously validated by 
Steinbart et al. (2013) to measure top management support. Responses to each question 
were on a five-point Likert scale that ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
Higher scores represent a better relationship and greater top management support. 
To assess the organizational structure of the information security function, we 
asked respondents to indicate the title of the person to whom the individual with primary 
responsibility for information security reported. We created a dichotomous variable that 
was coded 0 if the security function reported to the CIO or another person in IT and 1 
otherwise.  
We assessed the level of effort invested in information security by asking 
respondents to indicate the percentage of the total IT time budget that was devoted to 
information security activities. The seven response choices represented ranges of effort in 
increments of 5%, beginning with 0% to 5% and concluding with 30% or more. We coded 
the responses as an ordinal variable that ranged from 1-7. We measured size by asking 
respondents one question about the total number of employees at the organization. The 
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seven response choices each represented a size range, beginning with less than 20 and 
concluding with more than 10,000. As with level of effort, we coded size as an ordinal 
measure that ranged from 1-7. We also asked respondents whether the organization’s IAF 
activities were performed primarily in-house (i.e., 70 percent or more) or were outsourced. 
4.3 Dependent variables 
 We collected four measures to capture different aspects of the effectiveness of an 
organization’s information security program for the past three years. Two of the measures 
are leading indicators of the likelihood of future security incidents: (1) the number of 
internal control weaknesses related to information security and (2) the number of issues of 
employee non-compliance with IT policies. Both measures represent vulnerabilities that 
might lead to future exploits. We asked respondents to report the number of times both 
issues were serious enough to warrant being brought to the attention of executive 
management or the Board of Directors. Thus, both leading indicators reflect potentially 
serious problems, rather than trivial infractions.  
Our other two measures are lagging indicators of information security effectiveness: 
(1) the number of security incidents that were detected and stopped before they caused a 
material financial loss, interruption of operations, or reputation problem, and (2) the 
number of incidents that were detected after causing material harm. The first of these 
measures is important, as the ultimate objective of information security is to prevent or at 
least detect and stop incidents before they cause material harm. Since it is not possible to 
prevent all incidents (Ross, 2015), we also include a measure of information security’s 
ability to timely detect and stop incidents, so as to limit damage.  
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We used the same seven-point response scale for all four measures of information 
security program outcomes. The choices were zero, one, two, three, four, 5-10, and more 
than 10. Responses for all three years were combined to form a single reflective construct 
for each outcome.  
5. Results 
5.1 Demographics and descriptive statistics 
Respondents who indicated that they were internal auditors or worked in some 
other functional role were asked to answer the survey questions for the organization that 
employed them. They were also asked to assign a letter grade (e.g., “A”, “B”, “C”, “D”, or “F”) 
to represent their assessment of the effectiveness of their employer’s information security 
program. To ensure that we obtained information from a broad cross-section of 
organizations, respondents who identified themselves as being either external auditors or 
consultants were randomly assigned to two groups: one-half were asked to answer the 
survey questions for a client that would merit receiving a high grade (i.e., and “A” or a “B”) 
for information security effectiveness, and the other half were asked to answer the survey 
questions for a client for which they would assign a low grade (i.e., “C”, “D”, of “F”) for 
information security effectiveness.  
Of the 190 IMTA section members who responded to the email invitation to 
participate in the study, 110 provided responses to all four outcome measures. To test for 
non-response bias, we compared responses from the 58 participants who responded the 
first day the survey was open to those of 19 who responded when a reminder was sent out 
two weeks after the survey launch date. None of the values for the study’s variables 
differed significantly (p > 0.10) across these two groups. 
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Of the 110 individuals who completed the survey, 19 indicated that there was no 
IAF in their organization (either in-house or outsourced). Therefore, these respondents 
could not provide data about the relationship between the IAF and the information security 
function. Further inspection of the data revealed that another 14 respondents failed to 
answer all of the questions about the nature of the relationship between the internal audit 
and information security functions. Therefore, responses from 77 organizations are 
available to test our hypotheses.1 
Table 1 provides demographic information about our sample. The majority of the 
respondents who provided usable responses were male, possessed the IMTA section’s CITP 
certification (in addition to being a CPA or CA), and had more than 20 years of work 
experience. Our sample represents a wide cross-section of industries and includes 
considerable variation in organization size. 
Place Table 1 here. 
5.2 Model tests 
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our subsequent data 
analyses. Table 3 shows that our latent constructs are reliably measured.  
Place Tables 2 and 3 here 
We analyze the data using PLS, opposed to a covariance-based SEM technique for 
three reasons (Fayard, Lee, Leitch, & Kettinger, 2012; Hair, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2011). First, 
we have a relatively small sample size. Second, PLS is less sensitive than covariance-based 
                                                        
1 In addition, six participants provided incomplete responses to the measures of top management 
support. Two answered only three out of the five questions and four subjects answered four of the 
questions. We used each participant’s mean responses to the questions that they did complete to 
infer values for the missing responses. 
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SEM techniques to deviations from normality. Finally, our main objective in this study is to 
assess whether internal audit / information security function relationships predict 
organizations’ security outcomes, rather than confirm structural relationships. We used the 
WarpPLS v. 5.0 program to conduct our analyses (Kock, 2015). 
We performed a test of lateral collinearity on the constructs to test for common 
method bias (Kock & Lynn, 2012). This test compares the full collinearity of all latent 
constructs. All variance inflation factors (VIFs) are below the recommended threshold of 
3.3, indicating that the threat of lateral collinearity does not exist in the data.  
5.3 Hypotheses test results  
We first ran the model depicted in Figure 1 separately for each of our four 
dependent measures. The path from internal audit outsourcing to security outcomes was 
not significant (p > 0.10) for any of the four outcome measures, therefore, we dropped 
internal audit outsourcing as a control variable and ran the models again.2 Results from 
these analyses are reported below. 
H1a predicts that a good relationship between the internal audit and information 
security functions (RELQUAL) will influence leading indicators of information security 
effectiveness. As shown in Figure 2 and Table 4, the path coefficient from RELQUAL to both 
of the leading indicators is positive and significant. A positive relationship between the 
internal audit and information security functions increases the number of material internal 
control weaknesses related to information security (b = 0.210, p = 0.027) and the number 
of reported  IT-related noncompliance issues (b = 0.183, p = 0.047). H1b predicts that a 
                                                        
2 Hypothesis test results are substantively equivalent for analysis models that include internal audit 
outsourcing as a control variable.  
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good relationship between the internal audit and information security functions will 
increase the number of attacks that are detected and stopped before they cause material 
harm. H1c predicts that the nature of the relationship between the internal audit and 
information security functions will be associated with the number of attacks that are 
detected, but only after they cause material harm. Figure 3 and Table 4 show that a positive 
relationship between the internal audit and information security functions increases the 
number of attacks detected and stopped before they could cause material harm (b = 0.166, 
p = 0.064) and the number of detected harmful incidents (b = 0.161, p = 0.071). Thus, the 
results are therefore consistent with both H1b and H1c.  
Place Figures 2 and 3 and Table 4 about here 
H2a (H2b) predicts that top management support will improve leading (lagging) 
measures of information security effectiveness. Figure 2 and Table 4 show that top 
management support reduces the number of internal control weaknesses that are related 
to security (b = -0.189; p < 0.042) and the number of noncompliance issues (b = -0.212; p < 
0.025). However, Figure 3 and Table 4 show that top management support does not affect 
the number of incidents that were detected, either before (b = 0.099; p = 0.186) or after (b 
= 0.027; p = 0.406) causing harm. Thus, the results support H2a, but not H2b. 
H3 predicts that top management support should improve the quality of the 
relationship between the internal audit and information security functions. As shown in 
Figures 2 and 3 and Table 4, a higher level of top management support improves the 
quality of the relationship between the two functions (b = 0.522; p < 0.001). Thus, H3 is 
supported. 
 28 
H4a (H4b) predicts that when the CISO reports to someone outside of the IT 
function, leading (lagging) measures of information security will improve. Figures 2 and 3 
and Table 4 show that the reporting relationship of the CISO does not affect any of the four 
outcome measures (all p > 0.10). Thus, H4a and H4b are not supported. 
H5 predicts that the relationship between the internal audit and information 
security functions will be better when the CISO reports to someone outside the IT function. 
Figures 2 and 3 and Table 4 show that CISO reporting outside the IT department improves 
the quality of the relationship between the two functions (b = 0.300; p = 0.002). Thus, H5 is 
supported. 
Figures 2 and 3 and Table 4 also show that the control variables influenced the 
effectiveness of an organization’s information security efforts. Increasing the proportion of 
time that the IT function devotes to information security increases the number of incidents 
that were detected and stopped before causing harm (b = 0.238; p = 0.014) and reduces the 
number of incidents that caused material harm (b = -0.217; p =0.023). The proportion of 
time that the IT function devotes to information security has no effect on either the number 
of issues of employee noncompliance with policies or the number of internal control 
weaknesses related to information security (p > 0.10 for both). As expected, the number of 
employees is positively related to all the outcome measures (p < 0.01 for all measures), 
indicating that larger organizations are more likely to have more security-related internal 
control weaknesses, more issues of employee noncompliance with policy, and more 
incidents and attacks.  
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6. Summary and Discussion  
The escalating rate of cybersecurity incidents and the magnitude of associated fiscal 
and reputational impact is driving organizations to pay increased attention to 
cybersecurity risk (ISACA, 2016). This study makes a significant contribution to the 
literature by providing evidence that the quality of the relationship between internal 
auditors and managers responsible for information security improves information security 
effectiveness. In doing so, it answers Gramling, et al.’s (2004) call for research into how the 
IAF contributes to the overall effectiveness of governance. It also extends recent research 
on the association between internal audit working relationships and audit effectiveness 
(Ma’ayan & Carmeli, 2016) to the information security context.  
This study’s use of multiple outcome measures enables us to provide some insight 
into how the quality of the relationship between the IAF and the information security 
function affects outcomes. Prior research suggests that a good working relationship 
between the two functions can improve outcomes through a collaborative detection 
capability or through knowledge transfer (Havelka & Merhout, 2013). Our results for 
leading measures show that a better relationship between the internal audit and 
information security functions increases the number of information security-related 
internal control weaknesses and IT-related noncompliance incidents that are reported to 
the board of directors. This supports the notion that a key benefit of a good relationship 
between the internal audit and information security functions is improving the 
organization’s collaborative detection capabilities to identify leading indicators of 
information security problems. This result is also consistent with Lin et al.’s (2011) finding 
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that improved coordination between internal and external auditors results in a greater 
number of externally reported internal control weaknesses.  
We also find that a better relationship between the information security and 
internal audit functions increases the detection of incidents both before and after they 
cause material harm. The first of these findings is consistent with the idea that a good 
relationship between the two functions improves security through both improved 
detection capabilities and via knowledge transfer that leads to remediation of discovered 
problems. At first, the second finding concerning the number of incidents detected only 
after causing harm may seem counter-intuitive. However, most organizations’ IT 
infrastructure is constantly changing, thus making information security risk management a 
moving target.  Further, organizations cannot take steps to contain a problem, “stop the 
bleeding,” and take remedial action until they are aware that an incident has occurred. 
Surveys indicate that many organizations do not even know that they have suffered an 
incident until long after the attack (Ernst & Young, 2015; Lewis, 2013; Verizon, 2015). 
Consequently, low success in detecting attacks implies that there might be additional 
security incidents of which organizations are unaware (PwC 2016b). Therefore, one could 
argue that a higher number of detected harmful incidents actually indicates more effective 
detective measures related to information security. 
Our results also identify two antecedents to a good relationship between the 
internal audit and information security functions. The first is senior management’s 
commitment to the importance of information security. This finding is consistent with prior 
research which suggests that visible management support for information security may 
improve cross-functional relationships because it sends a message that management 
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expects all functional areas to coordinate and focus their efforts on improving security 
(Steinbart et al., 2012).  It is also consistent with normative arguments in the IT audit 
literature that top management must play a key role in establishing a culture of security 
and encouraging cross-functional collaboration (ISACA 2011). 
The second antecedent to a good relationship between the internal audit and 
information security functions is having the CISO report to someone independent of the 
information security function. It is likely that this occurs because the internal audit function 
focuses more on process improvements than on compliance when the CISO has an 
independent reporting relationship (San Miguel & Govindarajan 1984). This is an 
important finding, since there is very little research on how the perceived status and 
independence of auditees influences the nature and scope of internal audit engagements. 
Our findings with respect to the positive influence of both top management support 
and having the CISO report to someone outside the IT function on the relationship between 
the internal audit and information security functions have important implications for 
practice. These findings are consistent with COBIT 5’s (ISACA 2012a, 2012b) insistence on 
the importance of effective IT governance. Furthermore, because neither antecedent 
requires significant monetary investment, these results suggest a relatively low-cost 
strategy that organizations can follow to improve the effectiveness of their information 
security efforts.    
This study contributes to the literature by using actual outcomes, rather than 
perceptions, as the dependent variable to represent the effectiveness of an organization’s 
information security efforts. Because data on actual security outcomes is difficult to obtain, 
Steinbart, Raschke, Gal, & Dilla (2016) developed an instrument, which they named 
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SECURQUAL, to measure perceptions about an organization’s information security 
processes. They showed that it was a significant predictor of actual security outcomes, 
which in turn suggests that SECURQUAL might be useful as a surrogate measure for these 
outcomes. To further examine the potential of SECURQUAL as a surrogate measure, we 
conducted supplementary analyses (not tabulated) and found that the quality of the 
relationship between the internal audit and information security functions, top 
management support, and the CISO’s reporting relationship all significantly (p < 0.05) 
affected SECURQUAL. However, when we added SECURQUAL to our research model, it did 
not significantly improve the amount of variance explained in any of our four outcome 
measures. Moreover, SECURQUAL also did not mediate the effect of relationship quality on 
actual security outcomes. Thus, our supplemental analyses suggest that SECURQUAL may 
be useful as a “silver standard” dependent variable when data about actual security 
outcomes are not available. However, there is no need for researchers to use SECURQUAL 
when actual outcome data are available. 
This study also contributes to the literature by providing insight into how increased 
top management support improves information security. We find that increases in top 
management support for information security directly affect leading measures of 
organizations’ information security efforts, reducing both the number of significant 
reported internal control weaknesses related to information security and the number of 
significant instances of employee non-compliance with IT policies.  However, top 
management support does not affect either of the lagging measures of information security 
effectiveness. This pattern of results suggests that top management’s support primarily 
improves the effectiveness of the organization’s information security efforts by creating a 
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positive security culture characterized by more effective design and operation of security-
related controls. 
In addition, we found that a control variable for percentage of IT staff effort devoted 
to information security has a positive influence on lagging indicators of information 
security effectiveness. Thus, our results support normative arguments that recommend 
multiple levels of assurance involving the support of top management, direct involvement 
by line management, and independent assurance by the IAF (Institute of Internal Auditors 
2013a; ISACA 2011, 2012b).  
Finally, it is important to note the limitations of our study. First, our analysis is 
based on cross-sectional data. Indeed, it may take several years for improvements in IT 
governance structures to have an influence on security outcomes (Higgs et al., 2016). 
Hence, our finding that a good relationship between the internal audit and information 
security functions increased the number of security-related internal control weaknesses 
and instances of employee non-compliance with security policies may indicate that 
organizations in our study are reaping the benefits of collaborative detection, but have not 
yet reached the point where knowledge transfer reduces the number of such problems. 
Thus, investigation of the longitudinal effects of the relationship between the internal audit 
and information security functions on actual outcomes may help distinguish between the 
collaborative detection and knowledge transfer effects.  
A second limitation is that our analysis is based on self-reported data about 
outcomes. Given that information security is a sensitive area, it is difficult to obtain direct 
empirical data on security outcomes and breaches (Ransbotham & Mitra 2009). However, 
we mitigated this limitation by asking respondents to report specific objective measures, 
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rather than merely asking for global, subjective assessments about the effectiveness of an 
organization’s information security. Moreover, we collected such measures for three years, 
thereby increasing the reliability of our dependent measures. 
Third, because of constraints to limit the length of our survey instrument in order to 
encourage participation, we were not able to collect information about various measures of 
internal audit quality, such as auditor independence, qualifications, knowledge, and skills. 
It is likely that those characteristics may significantly affect the quality of the relationship 
between the internal audit and information security functions (Merhout  & Havelka, 2008; 
Stoel et al., 2012; Havelka & Merhout, 2013; Ma’ayan & Carmeli, 2016). Therefore, an 
important topic for future research is to investigate the influence of these internal audit 
quality measures, not only on the relationship between the internal audit and information 
security functions, but also on information security outcomes.  
 In conclusion, this study shows that the IAF can indeed contribute to the 
effectiveness of an organization’s information security efforts by developing and 
maintaining a positive collaborative relationship with the information security function. 
Nevertheless, much additional research is needed to more fully understand how that 
relationship, and similar relationships with other organizational units that are involved in 
various aspects of risk management, improve the effectiveness of an organization’s 
information security and its overall governance of IT.  
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Figure 1. Research Model 
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Figure 2. Results for leading indicators of information security effectiveness 
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 Figure 3. Results for lagging indicators of information security effectiveness 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Respondent Demographics 
  
Employment Role  
 Public Accounting 27 
 Consultant 12 
 Internal Auditing 11 
 Other 27 
 
Internal Audit Outsourcing 
 No      57 
 Yes      20 
 
Gender  
 Male 62 
 Female 15 
 
Certifications Possessed  
 CPA/CA  73 
 CISA  13 
 CISM  2 
 CIA  9 
 CISSP  5 
 CRISC  4 
 CITP 47 
 Other 19 
 None  3 
 
Work Experience  
 < 5 years 4 
 6-10 years 10 
 11-15 years 9 
 16-20 years 6 
 > 20 years 48 
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Panel B: Organization Demographics 
Industry  
 Government 6 
 Mining and Construction 3 
 Manufacturing 14 
 Technology 5 
 Financial Services 12 
 
Healthcare, Education, and Other 
Professional Services 15 
 Other 22 
   
Size (number of employees)  
 < 20 11 
 20-99 15 
 100-499  13 
 500-999  12 
 1000-4999  12 
 5000-9999  4 
  over 10,000  10 
  
 
 
 Internal Audit Employees  
 1-5   23 
 6-10   9 
 11-20 10 
 21-50 4 
 >50 3 
 Don’t know 8 
 Missing 20 
   
 Internal Audit Assigned to IT Audit  
 0 5 
 1-5 37 
 6-10 1 
 11-20 3 
 21-50 1 
 Don’t know 10 
 Missing 20 
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 Number of Employees in IT  
 1-10 33 
 11-25 11 
 26-50 5 
 51-100 8 
 >100 10 
 Don’t Know 10 
   
 
Number of Employees in IT dedicated to 
Information Security  
 0 3 
 1-5 45 
 6-10 9 
 11-20 6 
 21-50 1 
 >50 1 
 Don’t Know 12 
   
Total Assets  
 Zero to $10 Million  23 
 >$10 million to $50 million  5 
 >$50 million to $250 million 13 
 >$250 million to $500 million  7 
 >$500 million to $1 billion  9 
 >$1 billion to $50 billion 12 
 >$50 billion to $200 billion  3 
  >$200 billion to $500 billion 1 
 >$500 billion to $1trillion  1 
 more than $1 trillion  3 
 
  
 46 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Independent and Control Variables 
Construct Frequency %  Mean SD 
Information Security Reporting Structure 
(Binary)    
0.56 0.50 
   Reports to CIO (coded 0) 26 33.8%  
  
 Reports to Other than CIO (coded 
1) 33 42.9%  
  
 Missing 18 23.4%  
  
       
Effort Devoted to Information Security    3.29 2.19 
 0-5% (coded = 1) 19 24.7%  
  
 5-10% 16 20.8%  
  
 10-15% 12 15.6%  
  
 15-20% 14 18.2%  
  
 20-25% 4 5.2%  
  
 25-30% 1 1.3%  
  
 >30% (coded = 7) 4 5.2%  
  
 don't know 7 9.1%  
  
    
 
  
Number of Employees    3.66 1.92 
 less than 20 (coded = 1) 11 14.3%    
 20 - 99 15 19.5%    
 100-499 13 16.9%    
 500-999 12 15.6%    
 1000-4999 12 15.6%  
  
 5000-9999 4 5.2%    
 over 10000 (coded = 7) 10 13.0%    
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Panel B: Latent Constructs 
Construct Min Mean Median Max 
Std. 
dev 
Relationship Qualitya 1 3.67 3.75 5 0.91 
Top Management Supporta 1 3.49 3.60 5 0.99 
Noncompliance Issuesb 0 1.53 0.33 6 1.92 
Internal Control Weaknessesb 0 1.68 1.00 6 1.99 
Incidents Stopped Prior to Causing 
Harmb 0 2.20 1.30 6 2.21 
Incidents Detected After Causing 
Harmb 0 0.42 0 5 1.10 
 
a Scale: Strongly Disagree = 1 to Strongly Agree = 5 
b Scale: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5-10= 5, More than 10 = 6  
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Table 3: Latent Construct Reliability 
Panel A: Factor analysis: Cronbach alpha (in parentheses) and factor loadings   
Relationship Quality  Factor 
(0.91) 
Members of information security and internal audit work together to assure 
information systems are secure and reliable 
0.88 
There is little friction between internal audit and information security 0.88 
The relationship between members of information security and internal 
audit staff is best described as close and personal 
0.86 
There is a good working relationship between information security and 
internal audit 
0.92 
 
 
 
Top Management Support  Factor 
(0.93) 
Top management provides adequate resources for information security 0.89 
Top management regularly communicates the importance of information 
security 
0.91 
Top management believes that information security is an important issue 0.86 
Top management is more proactive as opposed to reactive with respect to 
information security issues 
0.89 
Top management is sufficiently aware of business implications of 
information security issues to include consideration of these issues when 
assessing risk and choosing appropriate response 
0.91 
 
 
 
Noncompliance Issues  Factor 
(0.96) 
During 2013 how many IT-related non-compliance issues were reported to 
the board of directors or executive management? 
0.95 
During 2012 how many IT-related non-compliance issues were reported to 
the board of directors or executive management? 
0.98 
During 2011 how many IT-related non-compliance issues were reported to 
the board of directors or executive management? 
0.95 
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Internal Control Weaknesses  Factor 
(0.96) 
During 2013 how many internal control weaknesses related to information 
security issues were communicated by the external auditors to 
management, board of directors, and/or executive management? 
0.95 
During 2012 how many internal control weaknesses related to information 
security issues were communicated by the external auditors to 
management, board of directors, and/or executive management? 
0.98 
During 2011 how many internal control weaknesses related to information 
security issues were communicated by the external auditors to 
management, board of directors, and/or executive management? 
0.95 
  
Incidents Stopped Prior to Causing Harm  Factor 
(0.97) 
During 2013 how many information security incidents were detected and 
stopped before they resulted in financial loss, business disruption, or public 
embarrassment? 
0.97 
During 2012 how many information security incidents were detected and 
stopped before they resulted in financial loss, business disruption, or public 
embarrassment? 
0.98 
During 2011 how many information security incidents were detected and 
stopped before they resulted in financial loss, business disruption, or public 
embarrassment? 
0.97 
  
Incidents Detected After Causing Harm  Factor 
(0.96) 
During 2013 how many information security incidents actually resulted 
in financial loss, business disruption, or public embarrassment? 
0.96 
During 2012 how many information security incidents actually resulted 
in financial loss, business disruption, or public embarrassment? 
0.98 
During 2011 how many information security incidents actually resulted 
in financial loss, business disruption, or public embarrassment? 
0.97 
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Panel B: Multi-trait Matrix a 
Construct CISORPT TMS PERC RELQLTY NEMP NONCOMP ICWEAK STOPPED DETECTED 
CISORPT  1.00 
        
TMS -0.32 0.78 
       
PERC -0.15 0.05 1.00 
      
RELQLTY 0.36 0.09 0.01 0.78      
NEMP -0.41 -0.01 0.32 0.11 1.00     
NONCOMP -0.23 -0.20 -0.03 -0.03 0.30 0.97    
ICWEAK -0.28 -0.02  0.03  0.01 0.41 0.65 0.92   
STOPPED -0.19 -0.18 -0.03  0.20 0.40 0.42 0.29 0.95  
DETECTED -0.18 -0.09 0.19  0.00 0.26 0.33 0.32 0.25 0.94 
a The diagonal of the matrix is the Average Variance Extracted for each variable. The remainder of the table reports the bivariate correlation coefficients. 
 
CISORPT: Information security reporting structure (coded 0 for within the IT function; 1 otherwise) 
TMS: Top management support  
PERC: Level of effort devoted to information security 
RELQLTY: Relationship quality 
NEMP: Number of employees 
NONCOMP: Noncompliance issues 
ICWEAK: Internal control weaknesses 
STOPPED: Incidents stopped prior to causing harm 
DETECTED: Incidents detected after causing harm  
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Table 4. Path Model Test Results. 
  
 
Relationship  
Quality 
 
Internal 
Control 
Weaknesses 
 
 
Noncompliance 
Issues 
Incidents 
Stopped Prior 
to Causing 
Harm 
 
Incidents 
Detected After 
Causing Harm 
Level of IT 
Effort Devoted 
to Information 
Security 
N/A 0.088 0.122 0.238*** -0.217** 
Number of 
Employees 
N/A 0.402*** 0.329*** 0.316*** 0.346*** 
Relationship 
Quality 
N/A 0.210** 0.183** 0.166* 0.161* 
Level of Top 
Management 
Support for 
Security 
0.522*** -0.189** -0.212** 0.099 0.027 
Information 
Security 
Reporting 
Structure 
0.300*** -0.093 -0.078 -0.029 -0.033 
R2 0.402 0.290 0.148 0.291 0.159 
Adjusted R2 0.386 0.240 0.088 0.241 0.100 
Significance levels: * = 0.10, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01      
 
 
 
